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Enforceability Of Land Use Servitudes Benefiting
Local Government In Washington
City and county governments in Washington commonly use
conditional approval of development applications as a land use
planning tool.' The terms of approval often require that the devel-
oper promise to use his land in a certain manner. If the developer
agrees, he records his promise as an equitable servitude to run
with the land.2 Both parties benefit by the conditional approval.
1. An excellent example of conditional approval is the contract rezone, in which the
governmental agency makes its approval contingent upon the developer's agreement to
act, or refrain from acting, in a certain manner after approval of the rezone. Some com-
monly imposed conditions are that the developer agree to pay the costs of extending public
utilities to the new development, grant land for additional street right-of-way or public
facilities, provide fencing or screening vegetation, or limit land use within a zoning district
to one particular use. See, e.g., Cederberg v. City of Rockford, 8 Ill. App. 3d 984, 291
N.E.2d 249 (1972); Hedrich v. Village of Niles, 112 Ill. App. 2d 68, 250 N.E.2d 791 (1969);
Church v. Town of Islip, 8 N.Y.2d 254, 168 N.E.2d 680, 203 N.Y.S.2d 866 (1960); State
ex rel. Myhre v. City of Spokane, 70 Wash. 2d 207, 442 P.2d 790 (1967). Although courts
in several jurisdictions have struck down contract rezoning, see, e.g., Baylis v. City of
Baltimore, 219 Md. 164, 148 A.2d 429 (1959), the Washington Supreme Court approved
the validity of such zoning in Myhre. In addition to rezones, preliminary plat approvals
are often conditional. 4 R. ANDERSON, AMERiCAN LAW OF ZONING, § 23.24, at 103 (2d ed.
1977); see, e.g., Approval Letter from Thurston County Planning Comm'n (June 10, 1977)
(platfile No. 228) (refers to several conditions, including one specifying no common house-
hold pets weighing over 250 pounds could be kept on the lots approved). Shoreline permits
may be approved conditionally. Brulotte v. Yakima County, Shor. Hear. Bd. Dec. No. 137
digested in [1979] WASH. ST. ENvia. Rpr. § 12-1 (Shoreline Hearings Board required
conditions and agreements to be written into the development permit). Further, because
the State Environmental Policy Act, WASH. Rav. CODE §§ 43.21C.010-.910 (1976), granted
local government the power to deny permits formerly issued on a ministerial basis, Poly-
gon Corp. v. City of Seattle, 90 Wash. 2d 59, 578 P.2d 1309 (1978), local governments may
attempt to condition such approvals in the future.
2. See, e.g., Andres v. Flossmoor, 15 111. App. 3d 655, 304 N.E.2d 700 (1973); Concom-
itant Agreement, Thurston County Planning Comm'n (Jan. 25, 1978) (rezone file No. Z-
6-77); Concomitant Agreement, Thurston County Planning Comm'n (Feb.23, 1977) (re-
zone file No. Z-11-76).
Equitable servitudes are used rather than their legal equivalent, restrictive cove-
nants, because those seeking relief generally want the equitable remedies of specific per-
formance and injunctions. Furthermore, the traditional legal requirements for privity
make enforcement of covenants at law more difficult than enforcement in equity. One
writer, considering the impediments to enforcement at law, concludes that covenants are
"next to worthless" for enforcement of residential restrictions. Paulus, The Use of Equita-
ble Servitudes in Land Planning, 2 Wn.LAMETr L.J. 399, 400 (1963). Although some
writers have found that the differences between equitable servitudes and covenants at law
have largely disappeared, Newman & Losey, Covenants Running with the Land and
Equitable Servitudes: Two Concepts or One? 21 HASTINGS L.J. 1319 (1970), the traditional
terms are used in this comment. Promise means a promise the original parties enforce
under the law of contracts. Covenant running with the land, or simply covenant, means a
promise enforceable at law by or against a successor in interest to land held by the original
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19791 Land Use Servitudes
The developer receives approval for a project that local govern-
ment would normally disapprove as not in compliance with local
land use plans, while local government controls the project's ad-
verse effects. Superficially, the arrangement seems ideal; the
effectiveness of the developer's promise, however, is unknown.:
Washington courts have not decided if an executory promise ben-
efiting local government is enforceable against the promisor's
grantee when the grantee has no independent contractual obliga-
tion.' Therefore, it is uncertain whether equitable servitudes ben-
parties. An equitable servitude, or simply servitude, is a promise enforceable in equity by
or against a successor in interest to land held by the original parties. A servitude may or
may not also be enforceable at law. See Stoebuck, Running Covenants: An Analytical
Primer, 52 WASH. L. REv. 861, 863-65, 906 (1977).
3. See London County Council v. Allen, [1914] 3 K.B. 642 (C.A.) (burdened land
transferred to wife of promisor; she built in violation of the promise and the Council had
no remedy).
4. Several enforcement mechanisms accompany the many sorts of conditional ap-
provals used. Generally enforcement is not complicated. The city or county can rescind
shoreline permits if the developer does not meet the conditions of approval, Shoreline
Management Act of 1971, WASH. REv. CODE § 90.58.140(8) (1976), deny a building permit
if the developer does not follow the specifications of a conditional zoning approval,
UNIFORM BUILDING CODE § 302(a) (1973 ed.) (adopted by reference at WASH. REV. CODE. §
19.27.030(1) (1976)), or deny approval of a final plat if it does not conform to the prelimi-
nary plat, WASH. REV. CODE §§ 58.17.150, .170 (1976).
In contrast, enforcement of promises still executory at the time local government
grants final approval to a project is more difficult. Rather than simply withholding further
approval, the governmental agency charged with enforcement must turn to the courts to
enforce such executory promises. Examples include promises to maintain screening vege-
tation, limit hours of operation, or maintain a particular use on a parcel of property. If
the original promisor no longer controls the land, the promise must run with the land to
be enforceable against the new property owner.
There are several reasons the promise may not be enforceable as part of an ordinance.
The most basic is that the municipality did not include conditions of approval (the
developer's promise) in its adopting resolution. E.g., Concomitant Agreement, Thurston
County Planning Comm'n (Jan. 25, 1978) (rezone file No. Z-6-77); Concomitant Agree-
ment, Thurston County Planning Comm'n (Feb. 23, 1977) (rezone file No. Z-11-76). Also,
zoning enabling legislation sometimes requires uniform regulations in each district, e.g.,
WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70.770 (1976), and a court might strike down conditions of a rezone
which specially limit only one parcel of land within a larger zoning district. A promise
running with the land may be the only enforcement mechanism available against a
landowner when the ordinance's conditions of approval are stricken. See Town of Selah
v. Waldbauer, 11 Wash. App. 749, 525 P.2d 262 (1974).
In the limited area of subdivision approvals, the legislature may have statutorily
provided that conditions of approval run with the land. Washington statutory law provides
that a prosecuting attorney may commence an action against a violator to compel compli-
ance with the conditions of a subdivision approval. WASH. REv. CODE § 58.17.320 (1976).
One writer indicates this provision would allow public enforcement of subdivision cove-
nants against lot purchasers. Goeltz, Subdivisions, Plats and Dedications, in LEGAL As-
PECTS OF LAND USE 1, 16 (1979). The statute does not, however, expressly vary the common
law and equitable rules for running of covenants. Therefore, the courts may find that the
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efiting local government will run with the land and bind subse-
quent owners.' After evaluating present Washington law, this
comment concludes that Washington courts should enforce equi-
table servitudes as useful land use planning tools for local govern-
ment.'
When analyzing local law the first considerations are the
general elements required to make equitable servitudes run:
form, notice, and touch and concern.' Because competent drafters
can meet the first two elements, they pose no general problems.
Regarding form, drafters must memorialize equitable servitudes
in a document signed by the promisor because courts consider
equitable servitudes property interests to which the Statute of
Frauds applies.' To ensure the promisor's successors have notice
legislature did not alter the traditional rules, but only intended to authorize the prosecut-
ing attorneys to enforce private covenants between a subdivider and lot purchasers. As
yet, no court has construed this section.
5. Governmental agencies have avoided using restrictive covenants and equitable
servitudes for many public land control purposes because such restrictions held in gross
may not run. Buescher, Conservation Easements and the Law, in Conservation Easements
and Open Space Conference 29 (Dec. 13, 1961) (sponsored by the Wisconsin Department
of Resource Development and State Recreation Commission) (advising state to avoid
purchase of covenants for conservation and open space purposes); Report of the Legal
Aspects Workshop, in Scenic Easements in Action (D)-7 (Dec. 16-17, 1966) (prepared by
the University of Wisconsin Law School) (suggesting a statute should "draft around" the
possible nonenforceability of covenants in gross); Address by Charles R. Martin, League
of California Cities Annual Conference (Oct. 14, 1968) (nonuse of deed restrictions in
connection with zoning results from doubts regarding enforcement against a subsequent
purchaser of restrictions held in gross).
6. Several writers have discussed using equitable servitudes as a land use planning
tool. E.g., Paulus, supra note 2; Siegan, Non-Zoning in Houston, 13 J.L. & ECON. 71
(1970); Note, Equitable Servitudes as a Land Use Planning Tool, 6 MEM. ST. U.L. REV.
101 (1975). These articles, however, deal with either private imposition and private en-
forcement of servitudes or private imposition and public enforcement under statutory
authority. This comment deals with public imposition and public enforcement of equita-
ble servitudes.
7. See 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §§ 9.24-9.40 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); C. CLARK,
REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH "RuN WITH THE LAND" 170-86 (2d ed. 1947);
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 539 (1944); Stoebuck, supra note 2, at 890-901.
8. 5 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 672 (P. Rohan rev. ed. 1979);
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 533, Comment b (1944); Stoebuck, supra note 2, at 890-92.
If enforced on a contract theory, however, the property Statute of Frauds does not apply
to equitable restrictions. At different times Washington courts have characterized equita-
ble restrictions as both property and contract interests. In Pioneer Sand & Gravel Co. v.
Seattle Constr. & Dry Dock Co., 102 Wash. 608, 173 P. 508 (1918), the Washington
Supreme Court said that a promise running with the land and enforceable in equity was
a "grant of valuable rights in real estate, and. . . a deed." Id. at 617, 173 P. at 511. Later,
in Johnson v. Mt. Baker Park Presb. Church, 113 Wash. 458, 194 P. 536 (1920), the court
held the statute did not apply because the equitable servitude involved was a contract
right, not an interest in property. As a practical matter, it makes little difference whether
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of the promise, the parties need record only a proper document
in the chain of title to the burdened land.' Unlike form and no-
tice, the touch and concern requirement is a doctrinal limit on the
class of promises that run with the land to bind subsequent own-
ers. Under touch and concern analysis, courts examine the sub-
stantive nature of the promise to determine if it relates to the
land." Regardless of the parties' intent, only promises related to
the land will run as equitable servitudes." This touch and con-
cern test, therefore, usually determines the enforceability of servi-
tudes.
Unfortunately, courts often impose the touch and concern
requirement without adequate analysis. A court may simply label
the promise "in gross," i.e., personal, and, consequently, refuse
to enforce it against subsequent owners."2 Sound policy reasons,
however, support imposition of the touch and concern test. First,
the test prevents promises unrelated to the land from encumber-
ing titles and thus furthers the pervasive judicial policy of pro-
moting free use and alienability of land. 3 Second, the test limits
the situations in which a court will enforce a contract against a
noncontracting party. As a means of making promises enforcea-
ble, the doctrine of covenants and servitudes running with the
land has contract characteristics. 4 But under traditional contract
theory, running servitudes are unusual because they bind a per-
son not a party to the original contract. Courts, accordingly,
should impose the touch and concern requirement to limit the
running of contract burdens in the real property context. 5 The
courts require a writing. Conditional land use approvals are invariably written, and even
if the promisor has not signed the approval, generally he has signed the application.
9. E.g., Wiegman v. Kusel, 270 Ill. 520, 110 N.E. 884 (1915); Oliver v. Hewitt, 191
Va. 163, 60 S.E.2d 1 (1950); Pioneer Sand & Gravel Co. v. Seattle Constr. & Dry Dock
Co., 102 Wash. 608, 173 P. 508 (1918); 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 7, at
§ 9.24; C. CLARK, supra note 7, at 183.
10. C. CLARK, supra note 7, at 96-97.
11. See Stoebuck, supra note 2, at 892.
12. E.g., Chandler v. Smith, 170 Cal. App. 2d 118, 338 P.2d 522 (1959); Orenberg v.
Horan, 269 Mass. 312, 168 N.E. 794 (1929); Shade v. M. O'Keeffe, Inc., 260 Mass. 180,
156 N.E. 867 (1927). In gross personal promises are those which relate to a person rather
than being appurtenant to land. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 703 (5th ed. 1979). In other
words, such promises do not touch and concern the land.
13. See Kent v. Koch, 166 Cal. App. 2d 579, 333 P.2d 411 (1958); Kotesky v. Davis,
355 Mich. 536, 94 N.W.2d 796 (1959); Burton v. Douglas County, 65 Wash. 2d 619, 399
P.2d 68 (1965).
14. See Stoebuck, supra note 2, at 864.
15. See Chaffee, The Music Goes Round and Round: Equitable Servitudes and
Chattels, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1250, 1258 (1956).
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burden runs to nonparties only when the promise concerns the
land itself.6 In a sense, courts enforce the promise against subse-
quent owners of the land because the promise binds the land
itself. Accordingly, the touch and concern test promotes free al-
ienability of land and limits the instances in which a promise
binds noncontracting parties.
While there is agreement that a touch and concern test is
necessary, the actual nature of the test varies. 7 The Washington
Supreme Court stated its touch and concern test in Rodruck v.
Sand Point Maintenance Commission." In Rodruck, the trial
court enforced an affirmative promise. to pay for road mainte-
nance against three subdivision lot owners. 9 The developer re-
corded restrictive covenants for the subdivision in 1929. The cov-
enants provided that a commission composed of the subdivision
lot owners was to own and maintain the subdivision streets. The
three lot owners purchased their lots in 1942 with record notice
of the covenant to pay their share of road assessments. After
annexing the subdivision in 1953, the City of Seattle assessed the
maintenance commission for street improvements. The commis-
sion, pursuant to the subdivision covenants, then assessed the
16. See Stoebuck, supra note 2, at 892.
17. Compare RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 537 (1944) with C. CLARK, supra note 7, at
97. The Restatement test focuses on physical benefit while the Clark test focuses on
modification of ownership rights.
18. 48 Wash. 2d 565, 295 P.2d 714 (1956). In Rodruck, the court treated the promise
as a covenant rather than a servitude. One commentator believes Rodruck is better consid-
ered as a servitude case, Weaver, Fear and Loathing in Covenants 37 (unpublished manu-
script completed in 1978, on file at University of Puget Sound Law School), reasoning that
similar promises in other jurisdictions have been treated as servitudes and are better
explained as such. Further, other commentators indicate there is no real distinction be-
tween covenants and servitudes. Newman & Losey, supra note 2; Stoebuck, supra note 2,
at 920. Whether the promise is characterized as a covenant or a servitude, the policy
concerns are essentially the same and the touch and concern standard generally is consid-
ered to be the same. See generally 2 AMEmcAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 7, at § 9.28;
5 R. POWELL, supra note 8, at §§ 675-679; Stoebuck, supra note 2, at 892. Because courts
have favored equitable enforcement of promises, there is some authority indicating the
touch and concern test is not as rigorous for equitable servitudes. See Pittsburg, C. & St.
L. Ry. v. Bosworth, 46 Ohio St. 81, 18 N.E. 533 (1888) (dictum); Hodge v. Sloan, 197 N.Y.
244, 17 N.E. 335 (1887).
19. At one time it was important to notice when a promise was affirmative. New York
had trouble enforcing promises to do affirmative acts and writers felt compelled to make
a distinction between affirmative and negative promises. See, e.g., 2 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY, supra note 7, at § 9.16; C. CLARK, supra note 7, at 100 n.22. Now, after New
York has found such promises enforceable, Nicholson v. 300 Broadway Realty Corp., 7
N.Y.2d 240, 164 N.E.2d 832 (1959); Neponsit Property Owners' Ass'n v. Emigrant Indus.
Say. Bank, 278 N.Y. 248, 15 N.E.2d 793 (1938), writers unnecessarily continue to explain
the former distinction, only to point out that it is no longer relevant. Stoebuck, supra note.
2, at 873, 893.
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costs to the subdivision lot owners. In their appeal, the lot owners
contended the promise did not touch and concern the land. Deny-
ing the appellant's contention, the Rodruck court established a
two-part touch and concern test: (1) the promise must substan-
tially alter legal rights associated with land ownership; and (2)
the promise must relate to the land so as to enhance the land's
value. 0
Courts apply the touch and concern requirement to a prom-
ise to determine if the promise will run with the land as a servi-
tude. For clear analysis courts must apply the test separately to
the benefit and burden sides of the promise.2' While it is clear
that the burden of a servitude must touch and concern the land,22
Washington courts have not decided if the benefit of a servitude
also must touch and concern the land.23
Under the Rodruck touch and concern test, the burden of a
publicly imposed land use servitude usually meets both aspects
of the test. The first aspect of the test, alteration of legal owner-
ship rights, is met by definition. Land use servitudes relate to the
land and modify rights connected with land ownership because
they restrict normal property uses. The second aspect of the test,
benefit to the burdened land, is met if local government properly
imposes a servitude. Local governments impose land use regula-
tions as an exercise of their police power. 24 Thus, for local govern-
ment to impose a servitude, the servitude must provide some
health, safety, or general welfare benefit to the community. The
burdened land, the land the servitude restricts, is the focus of the
area that receives the benefit. Therefore, the servitude benefits
the burdened land as well as the surrounding land. Just as the
burden of paying for better roads in Rodruck benefited the bur-
dened lots, so too the burden of a land use servitude benefits the
burdened land. Just as the court found that a road maintenance
servitude touches and concerns, so it should find that the burden
of a land use servitude touches and concerns.
20. 48 Wash. 2d at 575-76, 295 P.2d at 720-21.
21. See 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 7, at §§ 9.27 & 9.31; Stoebuck, supra
note 2, at 881-82, 901. The terms "burden side" and "benefit side" refer to the two sides
of a promise. The promisor has a duty to act or refrain as promised. His duty is termed
the "burden" of the promise. The promisee has a right to have the duty performed. His
right is termed the "benefit" of the promise. Id. at 864.
22. Rodruck v. Sand Point Maintenance Comm'n, 48 Wash. 2d at 574-75, 295 P.2d
at 720.
23. Weaver, supra note 18, at 42.
24. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 390 (1926); Lillions v. Gibbs,
47 Wash. 2d 629, 635, 289 P.2d 203, 206 (1955).
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Courts have found, furthermore, that burdens very similar to
those imposed by local government touch and concern the land.
For example, private subdivision covenants requiring that an ar-
chitectural review committee approve house plans run with the
land.25 The burden of such convenants is identical to the burden
of site plan review servitudes that local government imposes.
Both promises require approval of plans before construction. Pri-
vate subdivision building standards and use restriction servitudes
are further examples." The burden of such servitudes is identical
to publicly imposed site development servitudes. Because typical
public land use servitudes impose the same burden as private
subdivision use restrictions, Washington courts should find that
the burdens of land use servitudes touch and concern the land.
Equitable servitudes impose the same burden, whether a private
or public entity holds the benefit. 7
The most significant issue in enforcing a public land use
servitude is the touch and concern requirement applied to the
benefit side. There are two views: some jurisdictions require that
the benefit touch and concern land,28 while others allow a promise
25. E.g., Rhue v. Cheyenne Homes, Inc., 168 Colo. 6, 449 P.2d 361 (1969); Kirkley v.
Seipelt, 212 Md. 127, 128 A.2d 430 (1957).
26. Johnson v. Mt. Baker Park Presb. Church, 113 Wash. 458, 194 P. 536 (1920);
Foster v. Nehls, 15 Wash. App. 749, 551 P.2d 768 (1976).
27. This is not to say courts must find that the burden of any servitude touches and
concerns the land merely because it is imposed by local government. If local government
attempted to make a purely personal obligation run with the land, the Rodruck test would
not be met. A court should not enforce such an obligation against a nonparty because it
would thwart the policies behind the touch and concern test. But if local government
stays within the bounds of its police power authority to regulate land use and drafts
servitudes similar to those validated in the subdivision context, courts should find that
the burdens local government imposes touch and concern the burdened land.
While lawyers should generally treat public land use servitudes like private servi-
tudes, the drafters should give special attention to the method of termination. Servitudes
may be terminated in several ways. 2 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, supra note 7, at § 9.37.
One of the most common is for the holder of the burdened land to purchase the rights
associated with the benefited land. See id. at § 9.23. With public servitudes, however, if
courts find that the public or the government in a representative capacity holds the
benefit, see text accompanying note 39 infra, the holder of the burdened land may findit
impractical to purchase the servitude because of the large number of benefit holders.
Therefore, the drafters of the public servitude should provide an alternative method for
termination.
28. E.g., Chandler v. Smith, 170 Cal. App. 2d 118, 338 P.2d 522 (1959); Kent v. Koch,
166 Cal. App. 2d 579, 333 P.2d 411 (1958); Foreman v. Safe Deposit and Trust Co., 114
Md. 574, 80 A. 298 (1911); Orenberg v. Horan, 269 Mass. 312, 168 N.E. 794 (1927); Kotesky
v. Davis, 355 Mich. 536, 94 N.W.2d 796 (1959); Minch v. Saymon, 96 N.J. Super. 464,
233 A.2d 385 (1967); St. Stephen's Church v. Church of the Transfiguration, 130 App. Div.
166, 114 N.Y.S. 623 (1909), affl'd, 201 N.Y. 1, 94 N.E. 191 (1911); Stegall v. Housing Auth.,
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to run when the benefit is in gross.2" Although Washington appel-
late courts have not decided the issue,30 the majority of jurisdic-
tions require that the promise touch and concern benefited land.
3'
Those courts adopt a policy prohibiting in gross obligations from
running with the land and encumbering titles. Conversely, some
courts follow an equitable doctrine, originally articulated in Tulk
v. Moxhay, 2 that does not require the benefit of a servitude to
touch and concern the land.33
In Tulk the owner of several houses adjacent to Leicester
Square garden sold the garden subject to a servitude requiring the
purchaser and his successors to maintain the garden. After sev-
eral mesne conveyances the defendant purchased the property
with actual notice of his predecessor's promise. Because there was
no horizontal privity, the covenant could not run at law and the
defendant sought to build on the property. The equity court, after
finding the promise bound the defendant, enjoined him from
building.
The court based its holding on two theories. One was the
contract theory that a vendee with knowledge of the contract his
vendor made cannot disregard the obligation. Under this theory,
the court granted specific performance on the contract to prevent
the vendee from being unjustly enriched by purchasing inexpen-
sive restricted land and later selling the land for a greater price
free of the restriction. The other theory was based on property
law. The court reasoned, by analogy to easements, that the re-
striction attached to the property and bound subsequent pur-
278 N.C. 95, 178 S.E.2d 824 (1971); Clark v. Guy Drews Post of Am. Legion, 247 Wis. 48,
18 N.W.2d 322 (1945).
29. Van Sant v. Rose, 260 Ill. 401, 103 N.E. 194 (1913); Pratte v. Baltsos, 99 N.H.
430, 113 A.2d 492 (1955); Bill Wolf Petroleum Corp. v. Chock Full of Power Gasoline
Corp., 41 App. Div. 2d 950, 344 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1973); Huber v. Gugliemi, 29 Ohio App. 290,
163 N.E. 571 (1928). See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 539 (1944).
30. Weaver, supra note 18, at 42.
31. Newman & Losey, supra note 2, at 1137; see Chandler v. Smith, 170 Cal. App.
2d 118, 338 P.2d 522 (1959); Kent v. Koch, 166 Cal. App. 2d 579, 333 P.2d 411 (1958);
Foreman v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 114 Md. 574, 80 A. 298 (1911); Orenberg v. Horan,
269 Mass. 312, 168 N.E. 794 (1927); Kotesky v. Davis, 355 Mich. 536, 94 N.W.2d 796
(1959); Minch v. Saymon, 96 N.J. Super. 464, 233 A.2d 385 (1967); Genung v. Harvey, 79
N.J. 57, 80 A. 955 (1911); St. Stephen's Church v. Church of the Transfiguration, 130 App.
Div. 166, 114 N.Y.S. 623 (1909), aff'd, 201 N.Y. 1, 94 N.E. 100 (1911); Stegall v. Housing
Auth., 278 N.C. 95, 178 S.E.2d 824 (1971); Craven v. First Ci'tizens Bank & Trust Co.,
237 N.C. 502, 75 S.E.2d 620 (1953); Clark v. Guy Drews Post of Am. Legion, 247 Wis. 48,
18 N.W.2d 322 (1945); Reno, The Enforcement of Equitable Servitudes in Land, 28 VA.
L. REV. 1067, 1088 (1942).
32. 2 Phil. 744, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch. 1848).
33. See note 29 supra.
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chasers with notice.
Under the contract theory, the justification for allowing
promises to run is the policy against unjust enrichment. In Tulk
the vendee would have been unjustly enriched by selling free of
the restriction regardless of who owned the adjacent houses.
Therefore, the court could have enforced the promise on the con-
tractual theory alone, even if the promisee's right was only per-
sonal. Not surprisingly, several courts have followed the equitable
basis of Tulk and allowed servitudes to run when the promise
does not touch and concern on the benefit side. 4
The Washington courts' approach to touch and concern on
the benefit side will determine if public land use promises run
with the land as servitudes. If the courts focus on the equitable
policy against unjust enrichment and do not require touch and
concern on the benefit side, public land use servitudes generally
will run with the land because they meet the other requirements
for running. If, however, Washington courts require touch and
concern on the benefit side, to achieve proper results they must
apply the standard with regard to its underlying policy. Mechan-
istically applied, the touch and concern standard threatens al-
most all land use promises benefiting local government. These
promises are vulnerable to misapplication of the rule because
local government does not usually own land benefited by the
promise. If the courts look no further than the promisee's lack of
land ownership and conclude the promise is in gross, the in gross
rule bars the running of land use servitudes for the benefit of local
government. The promises would run only in the limited instan-
ces where the government actually owns benefited land.35
Mechanistic application of the rule against servitudes in
gross results in cases like London County Council v. Allen.36
Allen, a developer, received approval for a subdivision from the
County Council subject to the condition that he not build on two
34. Van Sant v. Rose, 260 Il. 401, 103 N.E. 194 (1913); Pratte v. Balatsos, 99 N.H.
430, 113 A.2d 492 (1955); Bill Wolf Petroleum Corp. v. Chock Full of Power Gasoline
Corp., 41 App. Div. 2d 950, 344 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1973); Huber v. Gugliemi, 29 Ohio App. 290,
163 N.E. 571 (1928); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 539 (1944).
35. In some circumstances local government will own nearby property, such as a city
or county park or road, to which the benefit could be appurtenant. That the beneficiary
has land in the vicinity of the burdened land, however, does not mean the servitude will
be appurtenant. In Kent v. Koch, 166 Cal. App. 2d 579, 333 P.2d 411 (1958), the court
found a servitude within a residential subdivision was in gross and hence unenforceable,
even though the plaintiff retained a parcel of land large enough for parking and a sign,
but too small for a building lot.
36. [19141 3 K.B. 642 (C.A.).
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lots so that the county could extend the existing road network
across the lots. The parties intended the promise to run with the
land. Subsequently, the developer's wife, with notice of the re-
striction, acquired one of the burdened lots. Disregarding the
restriction, Mrs. Allen built a house on the lot she obtained and
Mr. Allen built a wall on the lot he retained. When the County
Council sought to enforce the restriction, the court held Mr. Allen
to his promise and required him to remove the wall. In contrast,
the court refused to enforce the restriction against Mrs. Allen,
reasoning that the Council owned no benefited land and, there-
fore, the servitude was in gross.
The London County Council court recognized that at one
time the contractual specific performance rationale of Tulk v.
Moxhay had been broad enough to bind successors to the prop-
erty with notice of the restriction. Nevertheless, the court held
subsequent cases limited the Tulk contract theory supporting
servitudes to that of negative easements, which could not run in
gross. The court's conclusion that the benefit held by the County
Council was in gross ignores the reason behind the touch and
concern requirement. Touch and concern ensures that "mere col-
lateral promises," those promises personal to the parties in-
volved, do not run unnecessarily with the land and encumber
titles.37 Courts correctly find promises to be in gross only when the
promises benefit the individual rather than the land."' When local
govenment holds the benefit of a servitude that actually benefits
the land surrounding the burdened land, the policy behind the
touch and concern test is met. The London County Council court
reached an improper result because it incorrectly concluded that
all benefits are in gross when the promisee owns no nearby land.
In Washington there is no reason to find that land use servi-
tudes benefiting local government are in gross when local govern-
ment does not own nearby land. No case so holds. Moreover, very
often a land use promise to local government meets the Rodruck
touch and concern test on the benefit side even though the gov-
ernment owns no land nearby. Promises typically extracted from
a developer, such as those to protect the existing character of a
neighborhood, to prevent pollution of local groundwater supplies,
or to provide aesthetic benefits to the project area, substantially
alter rights associated with land ownership and benefit land in
the area. For example, a local government might require a
37. See text accompanying note 11 supra.
38. See note 10 supra.
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twenty-foot wide green belt planted with trees as part of a new
shopping center adjacent to residential uses. On the benefit side,
both elements of the Rodruck test are met; the promise benefits
adjacent residential property by what amounts to a scenic ease-
ment and the addition of the easement alters rights associated
with land ownership. Even though local government did not own
the adjacent property, the promise benefited the land. Courts
should recognize that actual touch and concern is present with
public land use servitudes, and allow such promises to run.
In the related area of subdivision covenants, some courts
have found touch and concern present although the recipient of
the promise owned no land. In the leading case from New York,
Neponsit Property Owners' Association v. Emigrant Industrial
Savings Bank,39 a subdivision homeowners' association owning no
land sought to enforce subdivision covenants. The original lot
deeds contained a promise binding the purchaser and his succes-
sors to pay an annual maintenance assessment. Property owners
formed an association to collect funds and maintain the subdivi-
sion. Later, the defendant bank purchased a lot and refused to
pay the assessment, claiming the promise did not touch and con-
cern the land. The court found touch and concern present, recog-
nizing land within the subdivision actually was benefited even
though the association itself owned no land.
The property owners' association in Neponsit is comparable
to a local government; although neither owns nearby property,
both represent property owners. 0 The benefit of a promise to
government touches land owned by the people government repre-
sents, just as the benefit in Neponsit touched land owned by
those the association represented. Because the promise benefits
land, the policy basis for touch and concern is met in both situa-
tions; the result should be the same in each.
Significantly, in Rodruck the Washington Supreme Court
relied heavily on the Neponsit rationale." Admittedly, Rodruck
is distinguishable from Neponsit because the property owners'
association in Rodruck actually owned benefited property. The
Washington court, however, did expressly adopt the reasoning of
39. 278 N.Y. 248, 15 N.E.2d 793 (1938).
40. This representation theory may also be useful to private property owners near the
burdened land when attempting to enforce the servitude on a third-party beneficiary
theory. The representative role of government implies an intent to benefit the nearby
public. See Rodgers v. Reimann, 227 Or. 62, 361 P.2d 101 (1961) and RESTATEMENT OF
PROPERTY § 541 (1941) for discussion of third-party beneficiary theory.
41. 48 Wash. 2d 565, 576, 295 P.2d 714, 721 (1956).
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Neponsit42 and the reasoning shows the benefit of a public land
use servitude touches and concerns the land because it benefits
nearby land.
Washington courts have additional reasons to find that pub-
lic land use servitudes meet the requirements for running with the
land. First, the Washington Supreme Court has recognized that
increasing population, growing urban concentration, and a wide
variety of potentially incompatible land uses have created an
"insistent social need" for land use control.43 Accordingly, the
court validated the use of contract zoning as a land use control
tool.44 Contract zoning allows governments to ensure land use
compatibility through individualized conditional approval of re-
zones rather than through grants of broad discretion to devel-
opers. To receive rezone approval, the developer must promise to
comply with the conditions. Commonly local government records
the conditions as equitable servitudes because it desires the equi-
table enforcement remedies of specific performance or injunc-
tion.415 It would be inconsistent for the court to provide a land use
control tool and later invalidate the most desirable means of en-
forcement. Because the Washington Supreme Court recognizes
the contract zoning tool, logically it also must recognize that
public land use servitudes run with the land.
Second, Washington case law does not constrain its courts to
reach the same result the London County Council court termed"regrettable" when it reluctantly denied enforcement of a land
use servitude benefiting local government.4" The English court
indicated it would have enforced the servitude had the contract
theory of Tulk v. Moxhay remained available."7 In contrast with
42. Id.
43. Chrobuck v. Snohomish County, 78 Wash. 2d 858, 874, 480 P.2d 489, 498 (1970)
(Finley, J., concurring).
44. State ex rel. Myhre v. City of Spokane, 70 Wash. 2d 207, 422 P.2d 790 (1967).
45. See note 2 supra.
46. [1914] 3 K.B. 642, 672 (C.A.). The court, indicating a concern that is still
relevant, said:
[It is] very regrettable that a public body should be prevented from enforcing
a restriction on the use of property imposed for the public benefit against per-
sons who bought the property knowing of the restriction, by the apparently
immaterial circumstance that the public body does not own any land in the
immediate neighborhood.
Id. at 673.
47. The court said:
[Alt the time of Tulk v. Moxhay and for at least twenty years afterwards, the
plaintiffs in this case would have succeeded against an assign on the ground that
the assign had notice of the covenant: since three decisions of the Court of
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the limited English theory, Washington retains a broad theory for
enforcing equitable servitudes.
The Washington Supreme Court expressed this broad equi-
table theory and its contractual underpinnings in Johnson v. Mt.
Baker Park Presbyterian Church.4" Johnson involved a subdivider
who represented to lot purchasers that the development would
be an exclusive residential area. Most deeds restricted develop-
ment to single detached residential buildings. The church pur-
chased a lot from the subdivider with knowledge of the grantor's
promises, but without the deed restriction. In an action brought
to prevent construction of a church building, the court found the
developer's promise ran with the land as an "equitable estoppel"
binding the subsequent purchaser. Just as the English court in
Tulk v. Moxhay focused on the broad principle that one purchas-
ing with notice of a restriction is not freed of the promise, the
Johnson court focused on the developer's promise, the purchaser's
notice, and the lot owner's reliance. Because Washington law
retains a broad equitable basis for servitudes, the courts can en-
force conditions imposed in the public interest and prevent possi-
ble unjust enrichment.
Finally, the Washington. Court of Appeals has begun to rec-
ognize and follow a strong national trend toward liberalizing and
expanding the running of servitudes." Formerly, the court ap-
plied a rule of strict construction to defeat the application of
running promises. 50 At that time, the court viewed servitudes as
undesirable encumbrances on title and limited their application
whenever possible. The court abandoned the strict construction
rule in Foster v. Nehls.51 The defendant in Foster built a two-story
house in a subdivision where covenants restricted building height
Appeals, the plaintiffs must fail on the ground that they have never had any
land for the benefit of which this "equitable interest analogous to a negative
easement" could be created.
Id. at 672 (citations omitted).
48. 113 Wash. 458, 194 P. 536 (1920).
49. Professor Stoebuck identifies the national trend. Stoebuck, supra note 2, at 919.
Professor Weaver recognizes that Washington has begun to follow the trend. Weaver,
supra note 14, at 51.
50. Burton v. Douglas County, 65 Wash. 2d 619, 399 P.2d 68 (1965); Granger v. Bouls,
21 Wash. 2d 597, 152 P.2d 325 (1944); Miller v. American Unitarian Ass'n, 199 Wash. 555,
171 P.2d 526 (1918). The policy is stated in Burton: "Restrictions, being in derogation of
the common-law right to use land for all lawful purposes, will not be extended by implica-
tion to include any use not clearly expressed. Doubts must be resolved in favor of the
free use of land." 65 Wash. 2d at 622, 399 P.2d at 70 (four justices dissenting). See Bersos
v. Cape George Colony Club, 4 Wash. App. 663, 484 P.2d 485 (1971).
51. 15 Wash. App. 749, 551 P.2d 768 (1976).
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to one and one-half stories. The court, despite evidence that the
height of a two-story house is no greater than that of a one and
one-half story house, expanded the covenant by construction to
prohibit "any residence which substantially obstructs the view in
question." 5 The court ordered the second story removed.
Under the old rule of strict construction the court would have
defined the restriction in feet and inches or would have invalida-
ted the restriction as an ambiguous attempt to measure height in
terms of area. But the Foster court recognized the value of land
use servitudes and did not treat them as unfavored encumbrances
on title. This change in perception resulted from the court's rec-
ognition that land use restrictions, such as subdivision servitudes,
increase the desirability and value of land by fostering orderly
development and providing a mechanism to avoid land use con-
flicts. 53 Washington courts should continue to recognize the valid-
ity of public land use servitudes because such servitudes further
the same land use planning goals the courts promote in the pri-
vate context.
In conclusion, the Washington courts are free to enforce pub-
lic land use servitudes. Of the elements required for a servitude
to run with the land, form, notice, and touch and concern on the
burden side do not bar running. Only the touch and concern
element applied on the benefit side is a potential bar. Washington
conceivably could allow public land use servitudes to run with the
land by following the minority position of not requiring touch and
concern on the benefit side. A less stringent theory, however, is
available to enforce public land use servitudes. Washington has
not adopted a rule that public servitudes are always in gross when
government does not directly own benefited land. Therefore, the
courts are free to require touch and concern on the benefit side
while recognizing that the requirement is met when the promise
benefits land, regardless of ownership.
Based on their past record, Washington courts probably will
enforce public land use servitudes. The courts have recognized
and responded to the need for land use control to manage growth
and development in the state, thereby furthering both public
zoning and private subdivision regulation." Accordingly, to be
consistent, the courts must enforce public land use servitudes.
Until the courts actually address the issue, however, uncer-
52. Id. at 750, 551 P.2d at 770.
53. See Stoebuck, supra note 2, at 919.
54. See text accompanying notes 43, 49 & 51 supra.
1979] 229
230 University of Puget Sound Law Review [Vol. 3:216
tainty remains about the enforceability of public land use servi-
tudes. To provide for the uncertainty, local government must
evaluate the risk involved in relying on such servitudes. If a con-
servative court's potential refusal to enforce the servitude creates
a substantial risk to the public interest, local government may
withhold its conditional approval of a developer's plans. This
results in a harsh loss of flexibility for both developers and local
governments. Therefore, the courts should take the first oppor-
tunity to establish the enforceability of public land use servi-
tudes. 51
Stephen Phillabaum
55. The state legislature could statutorily provide assurance that servitudes in gross
for the benefit of local government will run with the land. The County Planning Enabling
Act, WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70 (1976) or the City Planning Commission Act, WASH. REV.
CODE § 35.63 (1976) are appropriate places for such an amendment because they deal with
land use planning. There may be, however, another alternative to state legislative action.
Local governments could accomplish the same result within their boundaries by ordinance
if an ordinance that provides for running of land use servitudes in gross is a legitimate
planning purpose under the planning enabling acts or is a permissible exercise of police
power. Whether local government has that power is beyond the scope of this article.
Pierce County has already tried this approach in the Gig Harbor plan. The plan provides,
"The conditions and limitations established as part of the site plan approval process shall
(legally speaking) run with the land, thus will be binding on all successors in interest to
the applicant." Pierce County, Washington, Development Regulations for the Gig Harbor
Peninsula at 29 (June 30, 1975).
